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 NIRMALYA KUMAR, LISA K. SCHEER, and JAN-BENEDICT E.M. STEENKAMP*
 This study examines the role of supplier fairness in developing long-
 term relationships between relatively smaller, vulnerable resellers and
 larger, powerful suppliers. The authors conceptualize two components of
 fairness-distributive fairness, that is, the fairness of outcomes received
 by the reseller from carrying the suppliers line, and procedural fairness,
 the fairness of procedures and processes used by the supplier in relation
 to its resellers. Testing their hypotheses from the perspective of
 automobile dealers, the authors find strong evidence that vulnerable
 resellers' perceptions of both distributive and procedural fairness
 enhance their relationship quality, although these effects are moderated
 by the level of outcomes and environmental uncertainty. Furthermore,
 procedural fairness has relatively stronger effects on relationship quality
 than distributive fairness, which is a somewhat surprising result from a
 managerial perspective. The constructs and relationships among the
 constructs demonstrate cross-national stability across the two countries
 in the sample, the United States and the Netherlands.
 The Effects of Supplier Fairness on
 Vulnerable Resellers
 Many supplier-reseller relationships are highly asymmet-
 rical, especially those in which smaller, regional dealers are
 affiliated with larger, more powerful national manufacturers.
 It has been suggested that such asymmetrical relationships
 exhibit low cooperation, trust, and stability and high conflict
 (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987;
 Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Stern and Reve 1980).
 Asymmetry creates the potential for exploitation, some-
 thing that powerful firms have been known to take advan-
 tage of in dealing with their more vulnerable channel part-
 ners. A vulnerable reseller, unable to avail itself of tradition-
 al safeguards against supplier opportunism such as vertical
 integration or contractual protection (Heide and John 1988),
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 must often rely on its powerful partner's sense of fairness,
 and restraint to avoid mistreatment (Anderson and Weitz
 1992; Heide and John 1988). Consequently, resellers are, of
 necessity, concerned about supplier fairness.
 For example, Chrysler dealers have accused the automak-
 er of unfairly giving some dealers disproportionately large
 allocations of best-selling models and extended payment pe-
 riods (Wall Street Journal 1992). Peter Selden, one of the
 original Apple national account dealers, stated that "main-
 taining fairness and balance...should be the supplier's first
 concern" (McCarthy 1985).
 Although theorists and researchers suggest that fairness is
 important in developing effective marketing channel rela-
 tionships (Anderson and Weitz 1989, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr,
 and Oh 1987; Frazier 1983; Frazier, Spekman, and O'Neal
 1988; Gundlach and Murphy 1993; Kaufmann and Stern
 1988), the construct of fairness is still ambiguous and rela-
 tively underdeveloped. What constitutes fairness in market-
 ing channel relationships? How does the level of fairness af-
 fect channel relationships?
 To assess the role of fairness in the development of coop-
 erative long-term relationships, we examine fairness as a de-
 terminant of relationship quality. After defining these con-
 cepts, we develop our hypotheses. Following a discussion of
 research methodology, we test our hypotheses. Finally, we
 present the limitations and implications of our study.
 Journal of Marketing Research
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 THE EFFECTS OF FAIRNESS ON RELATIONSHIP
 QUALITY
 Relationship Quality
 Researchers have defined relationship quality as being
 manifest in several distinct, though related constructs (Cros-
 by, Evans, and Cowles 1990; Dwyer and Oh 1987). Al-
 though there is no consensus on which constructs comprise
 relationship quality, the critical importance of trust and in-
 volvement with the supplier in developing long-term rela-
 tionships has been emphasized. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh
 (1987, p. 24) note that "three constructs seem critical at the
 present stage of our understanding of the process of rela-
 tionship development: trust, commitment, and disengage-
 ment." Conflict is also pertinent. It is one of the most wide-
 ly studied phenomena in channels research due to its ubiq-
 uity and potential destructiveness (Anderson and Weitz
 1992).
 Therefore, we see relationship quality as encompassing
 conflict, trust, commitment, and two constructs that repre-
 sent the converse of disengagement-willingness to invest
 in the relationship and expectation of continuity. We con-
 ceptualize relationship quality as a higher order concept, im-
 plying that a better quality relationship results in a lower
 level of conflict as well as greater trust, commitment, ex-
 pectation of continuity, and willingness to invest. We focus
 on relationship quality from the reseller's perspective.
 Fairness in Channel Relationships
 The reseller's perception of supplier fairness is expected
 to enhance reseller relationship quality. Dwyer, Schurr, and
 Oh (1987) regard justice in interactions as necessary for de-
 veloping trust between business partners.l Anderson and
 Weitz (1989) observe that suppliers with a reputation for
 fairness engender greater trust and expectation of continuity.
 More powerful suppliers may ignore reseller complaints
 about injustice. Because vulnerable resellers often have few
 avenues for redress, those who are subjected to unfairness
 are likely to experience hostility toward the supplier. Thus,
 supplier unfairness is likely to have a detrimental impact on
 relationship quality.
 What constitutes fairness versus unfairness in channel re-
 lationships? An examination of channel firm fairness can
 focus on issue-specific fairness or the overall fairness of the
 relationship with the channel partner. Issue-specific fairness
 could involve, for example, an assessment of the supplier's
 fairness in pricing policies, territory assignment, the distri-
 bution and allotment of scarce products, or the fairness of
 specific contractual restrictions and responsibilities.
 Issue-specific fairness is relevant for the examination of
 reseller attitudes regarding specific issues, policies, or pro-
 grams. By contrast, consistent with our emphasis on rela-
 tionship quality, we focus on the reseller's perception of the
 overall fairness of its relationship with the supplier.
 Extensive research on organizational and social justice
 has identified two distinct categories of fairness-distribu-
 tive fairness, that is, the fairness of outcomes received, and
 procedural fairness, that is, fairness of process (see Tyler
 and Lind 1992 for a recent review).
 Given their prevalence and consistency across a wide va-
 riety of contexts, distributive fairness and procedural fair-
 ness promise to shed new light on channel relationships.
 Previous conceptualizations of fairness in marketing chan-
 nels have focused on either (1) a channel partner's reputa-
 tion for fairness (Anderson and Weitz 1989, 1992), a global
 evaluation that presumably would be based on both dis-
 tributive and procedural fairness, or (2) distributive fairness
 within the relationship (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987;
 Frazier 1983; Frazier, Spekman, and O'Neal 1986). None,
 however, has explicitly examined procedural fairness or em-
 pirically investigated distributive fairness.
 Distributive fairness refers to the reseller's perception of
 the fairness of earnings and other outcomes that it receives
 from its relationship with the supplier. Distributive fairness
 "relates to the division of benefits and burdens" (Frazier,
 Spekman, and O'Neal 1988, p. 60) and can be viewed as an
 evaluation of the channel partner's relative rewards (or loss-
 es) in comparison to its respective contributions or inputs
 (Frazier 1983, p. 74). Following others, we conceptualize
 distributive fairness as a firm's comparison of its actual out-
 comes to those outcomes the firm deems it deserves (Frazier
 1983).
 Procedural fairness refers to the reseller's perception of
 the fairness of the supplier's procedures and processes in re-
 lation to its resellers. Previously, researchers have conceptu-
 alized and measured overall procedural fairness either in
 global terms or through a composite of several components.
 We chose to concentrate on the latter approach, because it is
 managerially more useful (Kumar, Stem, and Achrol 1992).
 Depending on the context of the study, researchers differ
 on which principles they see as comprising procedural fair-
 ness. However, some principles appear consistently in re-
 search on justice in organizational, legal, political, and in-
 terpersonal settings (Tyler and Lind 1992). These six key, in-
 terrelated components of procedural fairness are: (1) bilat-
 eral communication, the willingness of the supplier to en-
 gage in two-way communication with its resellers, (2) im-
 partiality, the consistency of the supplier's channel policies
 across resellers, (3) refutability, the extent to which resellers
 can challenge the supplier's channel policies, (4) explana-
 tion, the degree to which the supplier provides resellers with
 a coherent rationale for its channel decisions and policies,
 (5) knowledgeability, the supplier's familiarity with the local
 conditions under which resellers operate, and (6) courtesy,
 being polite and respectful. Our confidence in the credibili-
 ty of these six principles was bolstered because they fre-
 quently arose in our discussions with resellers. In addition,
 five of the components were used by Kim and Mauborgne
 (1991) in their studies on headquarters-subsidiary relation-
 ships, a context similar to interoiganizational relationships.
 Value can be gained from assessing both distributive and
 procedural fairness, because they are conceptually distinct,
 created through different practices, and affected by different
 parties. Distributive fairness is based on reseller outcomes,
 whereas procedural fairness concerns supplier behavior.
 Many elements have an impact on distributive fairness,
 IFollowing others (e.g., Tyler and Lind 1992), the terms fairness and jus-
 tice are used interchangeably.
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 er control, and others external to the supplier-dealer
 relationship.
 Procedural fairness, by contrast, is composed largely of
 elements under the supplier's control. Although fair proce-
 dures often help generate fair outcomes, such is not always
 the case. Fair outcomes may be obtained, even though the
 supplier's procedures are not fair. On the other hand, dealer
 outcomes may be comparatively unfair despite fair supplier
 procedures (Tyler and Lind 1992).
 Effects of Distributive and Procedural Fairness on
 Relationship Quality
 Channels researchers have theorized that perceived injus-
 tice in outcomes received will result in unfavorable affective
 reactions and conflict within channel relationships (Frazier
 1983; Frazier, Spekman, and O'Neal 1988). Consistent with
 this, we hypothesize that distributive fairness will have a
 positive effect on relationship quality. Focusing solely on
 distributive fairness is incomplete, however, because organi-
 zational research reveals that distributive fairness and proce-
 dural fairness are distinct elements that can have an impact
 on a business relationship. The use of fair procedures pro-
 motes the expectation of fair treatment in the future that
 leads, in turn, "to a generalized sense of positive regard for,
 and attachment to, the organization" (Konovsky and
 Cropanzano 1991, p. 699). Consistent with this, Kaufmann
 and Stern (1988) find that perceived unfairness in dispute
 resolution procedures results in higher levels of retained
 hostility.
 Interestingly, evidence from justice research in a variety
 of settings (Tyler and Lind 1992) indicates that procedural
 fairness often has stronger effects than distributive fairness
 on conflict, trust, commitment, and turnover.
 Why is procedural fairness more strongly related to these
 relational constructs than distributive fairness? One reason
 is that outcomes received and the associated distributive
 fairness assessments tend to be rather unstable, whereas pro-
 cedures have a more enduring quality (Tyler and Lind 1992).
 Whereas the reseller's assessment of the supplier's procedu-
 ral fairness is determined by its direct interaction with the
 supplier and its observation of the supplier's actions, dis-
 tributive fairness assessments require the reseller to specu-
 late and make assumptions regarding various factors, both
 within and outside of the relationship. Thus, distributive
 fairness assessments are likely to be less confidently held
 than procedural fairness perceptions. Finally, reseller out-
 comes are affected not only by the supplier but also by its
 own actions and forces external to the channel. Procedural
 fairness perceptions may therefore be considered more in-
 dicative of the supplier's overall fairness, because they are
 more directly attributed to that supplier. Consequently, we
 propose:
 Ha: A reseller's perceptions of distributive and procedural fair-
 ness will have positive effects on relationship quality.
 Hlb: A reseller's perception of procedural fairness will have a
 stronger effect on relationship quality than will the re-
 seller's perception of distributive fairness.
 We now consider level of outcomes, relationship age, and
 environmental uncertainty, three variables that previous or-
 gani7ational and channels research suggest may moderate
 the hypothesized overall effects of distributive and procedu-
 ral fairness on relationship quality.
 The Effects of the Level of Outcomes
 Various marketing channel studies demonstrate positive
 effects of favorable outcomes on relational attitudes (Ander-
 son and Narus 1984, 1990; Kumar, Stem, and Achrol 1992;
 Scheer and Stern 1992). The reseller's assessment of the dis-
 tributive fairness is distinct from the outcomes the reseller
 receives from the relationship. Although there is a tendency
 for unfavorable outcomes to be perceived as more unfair
 than favorable outcomes (Greenberg 1987), distributive fair-
 ness can exist despite rather unfavorable outcomes, and
 highly favorable outcomes do not in and of themselves con-
 stitute fair outcomes.2 We expect that both favorable out-
 comes and distributive fairness will have positive effects on
 relationship quality, even when accounting for the effect of
 outcomes.
 Two explanations have been offered regarding the rela-
 tionship between outcomes and procedural fairness-the
 group-value model and the self-interest model (Ambrose,
 Harland, and Kulik 1991; Lind and Tyler 1988). The group-
 value model argues that procedural fairness is important in
 its own right. Concerns about procedural fairness stem from
 what they indicate about how one is valued. Fair process by
 the supplier validates the reseller's status as being important
 to the supplier's network. The group-value model therefore
 suggests that procedural fairness is a critical determinant of
 relationship quality, even in the face of highly favorable out-
 comes. Evidence for the group-value model in marketing
 channels research is provided by the consistent linkage be-
 tween the use of threats and punishments and the associated
 negative effects on relational attitudes (e.g., Frazier, Gill,
 and Kale 1989; Scheer and Stern 1992).
 By contrast, the self-interest model suggests that fair pro-
 cedures have worth because they are instrumental in ulti-
 mately producing the truly valued end-more favorable out-
 comes. In this view, the reseller should become insensitive
 to violations of procedural fairness as outcomes become
 more favorable, shifting its focus instead to distributive fair-
 ness. Because studies conducted in social psychology do not
 consistently support only one of these models, researchers
 have concluded that both models may operate simultaneous-
 ly (Ambrose, Harland, and Kulik 1991; Lind and Tyler
 1988). As suggested by the self-interest model, we posit that
 the level of outcomes will have a positive impact on rela-
 tionship quality and that as the level of outcomes from the
 relationship increases, the importance of procedural fairness
 decreases while the importance of distributive fairness in-
 creases. However, consistent with the group-value model,
 we still anticipate that procedural fairness will have a posi-
 tive effect on relationship quality, even after accounting for
 20ur measures of distributive fairness and outcomes given alternatives
 were clearly distinguishable at the empirical level. In a confirmatory factor
 analysis of the pooled data involving distributive fairness, procedural fair-
 ness, and outcomes given alternatives as three correlated factors, the corre-
 lation between distributive fairness and outcomes given alternatives was
 .434, which is significantly below unity (p < .001). Moreover, if distributive
 fairness and outcomes given alternatives were specified to load on the same
 factor, the increase in chi-square was highly significant (chi-square differ-
 enc  = 649.87 with 2 degrees of freedom, p < .0001).
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 the effect of outcomes (i.e., the hypothesized main effect
 proposed in Hia). We propose:
 H2a: The level of outcomes received by the reseller will have a
 positive effect on relationship quality.
 H2b: The level of outcomes moderates the effects of procedural
 and distributive fairness on relationship quality. As the out-
 comes received from the relationship increase, the impor-
 tance of procedural fairness decreases and the importance
 of distributive fairness increases.
 The Effects of Relationship Age
 As Anderson and Weitz (1989) demonstrate that trust and
 expectations of continuity increase as relationships mature,
 we posit that age has a positive impact on relationship qual-
 ity; the relationship between age and fairness is less clear,
 however. Frazier (1983) and Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987)
 argue that exchange partners in the early stages of the rela-
 tionship tend to focus on expected rewards and investments.
 No matter how fair a supplier's procedures are in relation
 to its dealers, a rational reseller is likely to avoid a relation-
 ship in which the outcomes are perceived to be unfair. If de-
 served rewards are not forthcoming, the relationship quick-
 ly terminates. If fair outcomes are received, the stage is set
 for possible movement into a deeper relationship. In this
 view, distributive fairness is established early in the rela-
 tionship and is a necessary precondition for relationship
 expansion.
 Procedural fairness is expected to become increasingly
 important as the relationship progresses; the supplier's ac-
 tions and policies must be perceived as fair for the relation-
 ship to deepen into a longer term commitment (Dwyer,
 Schurr, and Oh 1987). Based on this reasoning, we
 hypothesize:
 H3a: Age will have a positive effect on relationship quality.
 H3b: Age moderates the effects of procedural and distributive
 fairness on relationship quality. As relationships get older,
 the importance of procedural fairness increases and the im-
 portance of distributive fairness decreases.
 The Effects of Environmental Uncertainty
 Organi7zational as well as channels research argues that
 the level of friction and perceived conflict between relation-
 ship partners will increase in uncertain environments
 (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983). Furthermore, parties want
 to remain flexible in such uncertain environments (Dwyer
 and Oh 1987), and consequently they exhibit lower commit-
 ment and lower expectations of continuity. Dwyer and Oh
 (1987) report that environmental munificence is positively
 correlated with relationship quality; this implies that envi-
 ronmental scarcity, a situation rife with uncertainty, is asso-
 ciated with low relationship quality. Therefore, we posit that
 environmental uncertainty will have a negative impact on re-
 lationship quality.
 Outcomes are likely to fluctuate widely in uncertain envi-
 ronments. Under such circumstances, resellers are increas-
 ingly likely to make external attributions for their outcomes
 (whether positive or negative), realizing that the supplier's
 control over these outcomes is lower than in more stable en-
 ness to evaluate the relationship, it becomes less important
 as a determinant of relationship quality, whereas procedural
 fairness becomes even more important, because the partner
 will still be considered to be in control of its behavior and
 policies. Therefore:
 H4a: Environmental uncertainty will have a negative effect on re-
 lationship quality.
 H4b: Environmental uncertainty moderates the effects of proce-
 dural and distributive fairness on relationship quality. As
 environmental uncertainty increases, the importance of pro-
 cedural fairness increases and the inipoilance of distribu-
 tive fairness decreases.
 METHOD
 Sample and Data Collection Procedure
 We test our hypotheses with a sample drawn from the au-
 tomobile industry, where relatively small regional dealers
 are affiliated with large powerful national manufacturers.
 Given our interest in the reactions of resellers to perceived
 unfairness, data were collected from automobile dealers,
 who were gleaned from commercial lists. As is typical of
 most marketing studies, we build on research that has been
 conducted in the United States. Organi7ational researchers
 have argued that concepts and measures developed in the
 United States may be culture bound (Hofstede 1993). As
 firms grow increasingly international in character, the need
 to establish cross-national validity of theoretical concepts
 and models of marketing channel relationships becomes
 more germane (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989). Based on
 these considerations and the implementation of the Europe
 1992 program, we decided to test our hypotheses with auto-
 mobile dealers in two countries-the United States and the
 Netherlands.
 In the United States, the list of 2100 new car dealers in
 two states was reduced by deleting duplicate listings and
 those dealers for whom no contact name was available. Sur-
 veys with personalized cover letters were mailed to 1640 au-
 tomobile dealers, with follow-up letters to nonrespondents 4
 weeks later. Questionnaires were received from 453 auto-
 mobile dealers, a response rate of 28%. After elimination of
 questionnaires for which excessive amounts of data were
 missing, the final U.S. sample consisted of 417 dealers.
 In the Netherlands, the questionnaire was mailed to a ran-
 dom sample of 1600 dealers drawn from a list of 4000 new
 car dealers representing the entire country. Because no con-
 tact name was available for these dealers, cover letters were
 not personalized. Furthermore, because of resource limita-
 tions, no follow-up letters were mailed. These factors low-
 ered our response rate to 19%, with 309 questionnaires re-
 turned. After elimination of questionnaires with missing
 data, the final Dutch sample consisted of 289 dealers.
 Our response rates, while low, are within the range re-
 ported for channel studies. Nonresponse bias was evaluated
 by comparing early respondents with late respondents, using
 the Armstrong and Overton (1977) procedure. Because no
 significant differences (p > .10) were found on any of the
 constructs considered in this study, nonresponse bias did not
 appear to be a problem.
 Dealers in both countries were asked to report on the au-
 vironments. Given the difficulty of using distributive fair-
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 ers and an automobile importer for the Dutch dealers) whose
 product line accounted for the largest share of their firm's
 sales. Telephone calls were made to a subset of the dealers
 to ensure that the informant was the person in the organiza-
 tion who most frequently interacted with the supplier and
 consequently was the most knowledgeable about the rela-
 tionship with the supplier (Kumar, Stem, and Anderson
 1993). These confirmations and an examination of the titles
 held by the informants (President, Owner, General Manag-
 er, or some combination thereof) suggest that our informants
 were competent.
 Measure Development
 Whenever possible, we attempted to use multi-item mea-
 sures that had been previously utilized in channels research.
 Where a new scale had to be developed, we were guided ini-
 tially by the construct definitions and the scales utilized in
 organizational research. The resulting scales were then mod-
 ified after face-to-face interviews with dealers.
 To enhance translation equivalence (Douglas and Craig
 1983), the original English version of the questionnaire was
 first translated into Dutch by one person and then retranslat-
 ed into English by a second person, each of whom was flu-
 ent in both languages. Any differences that emerged were
 reconciled by the two expert translators. Finally, to further
 ensure that the dealers would be able to adequately compre-
 hend the translated items, a draft of the final Dutch ques-
 tionnaire was administered in face-to-face interviews to a
 number of dealership managers. Some minor wording
 changes were made on the basis of their feedback. The final
 measures appear in the Measurement Appendix.
 Distributive fairness was assessed using five items adapt-
 ed for an interorganizational application from the Distribu-
 tive Justice Index developed by Price and Mueller (1986).
 The items require the dealer to assess, relative to several fac-
 tors, the fairness of its outcomes and earnings from carrying
 the supplier's line. The correlation between this scale and a
 global item of distributive fairness ("considering everything,
 our firm's earnings and outcomes from this supplier's prod-
 uct line are fair") is .52 both in the United States and in the
 Netherlands, providing additional evidence of convergent
 validity.3
 Procedural fairness items were adapted for this study
 from measures previously utilized in organizational settings
 (Kim and Mauborgne 1991; Konovsky and Cropanzano
 1991). Two items measuring each of the six principles of bi-
 lateral communication, impartiality, refutability, explana-
 tion, knowledgeability, and courtesy were averaged, gener-
 ating six indicators for a procedural fairness scale. The cor-
 relation between this scale and a two-item global measure of
 procedural fairness ("generally treat dealers fairly" and
 "have fair policies regarding their dealers") is .83 in the
 United States and .82 in the Netherlands.
 Relationship quality, following our theoretical conceptu-
 alization, was seen as being reflected in conflict, trust, com-
 mitment, continuity, and willingness to invest. To obtain a
 comprehensive coverage of conflict and trust, each was op-
 erationalized as two distinct constructs. Consequently, rela-
 tionship quality was manifest in seven first-order factors.
 Conflict is usually viewed as a process composed of var-
 ious different, potentially overlapping stages: latent conflict,
 perceived conflict, affective conflict, manifest conflict, and
 conflict aftermath (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991). The
 two more frequently studied aspects of conflict in marketing
 channels are affective and manifest conflict. Affective con-
 flict is defined as hostility, frustration, and anger toward a
 channel partner (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991; Frazier,
 Gill, and Kale 1989; Kaufmann and Stern 1988). These feel-
 ings of hostility can erupt into manifest conflict, behavioral
 responses such as open expression of disagreements or overt
 attempts to prevent the other from achieving its goals (An-
 derson and Narus 1990; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1991). A
 four-item scale of affective conflict was developed for this
 study. Manifest conflict was measured by a two-item scale
 previously utilized by Frazier, Gill, and Kale (1989). The
 correlation between these two types of conflict (.62, U.S.;
 .61, Netherlands) is significantly below unity, providing ad-
 ditional evidence of discriminant validity.
 A consensus seems to be emerging in social psychology
 that interpersonal trust encompasses two essential elements
 (e.g., Deutsch 1958; Larzelere and Huston 1980; Rempel,
 Holmes, and Zanna 1985). One is trust in the partner's hon-
 esty, the belief that one's partner stands by its word (Ander-
 son and Narus 1990), fulfills promised role obligations, and
 is sincere (Dwyer and Oh 1987; Scheer and Stem 1992).
 The second is trust in the partner's benevolence, a firm's be-
 lief that its partner is interested in the firm's welfare
 (Deutsch 1958; Larzelere and Huston 1980; Rempel,
 Holmes, and Zanna 1985), is willing to accept short-term
 dislocations (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987), and will
 not take unexpected actions that would have a negative im-
 pact on the firm (Anderson and Narus 1990). Each compo-
 nent of trust-honesty and benevolence-was measured by
 five items. The correlation in the United States and the
 Netherlands, respectively, of a global trust item ("our firm
 feels we can trust the supplier's organization") with the hon-
 esty scale is .76 and .65, and with the benevolence scale is
 .76 and .62. Although the two facets of trust demonstrate a
 strong positive correlation (.72, U.S.; .62, Netherlands), the
 correlations are significantly below unity, bolstering dis-
 criminant validity.
 Commitment concerns a party's intention to continue the
 relationship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Scheer and Stern
 1992). A firm exhibiting affective commitment wants to
 maintain a channel relationship because of its positive effect
 toward and identification with the channel partner. Affective
 commitment was measured by three items developed for this
 study based on scales utilized in organizational research
 (Meyer, Allen, and Smith 1993).
 In contrast to commitment, which assesses only the re-
 seller's intention to stay in the relationship, expectation of
 continuity incorporates the reseller's perceptions of both its
 own and its supplier's continuity intentions. The scale was
 composed of three items previously utilized by Noordewier,
 John, and Nevin (1990) as well as Anderson and Weitz
 (1989).
 A three-item scale to assess the dealer's willingness to in-
 vest in the supplier's line was developed. We conceptualized
 investment broadly, including capital investment, effort de- s3A correlations reported in this section are significant at p < .001.
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 voted to the supplier's line, and willingness to increase iden-
 tification with the supplier. For the reseller, each of these ac-
 tions is an investment in the relationship that involves some
 risk.
 The level of outcomes can be measured relative to a num-
 ber of standards such as alternatives or expectations (Ander-
 son and Narus 1984). Outcomes given alternatives was the
 operationalization used in this study, because it seemed the-
 oretically and managerially interesting to examine whether
 fairness would matter to dealers if they were getting out-
 comes in excess of those available from alternative
 relationships.
 We adapted three items from the Anderson and Narus
 (1984) scale, adding a fourth item based on preliminary
 dealer interviews concerning the ability of the supplier's line
 to generate customer traffic. A number of dealers stated that
 despite generating relatively poor profits from new car sales,
 carrying the manufacturer's line generated customer traffic
 for other more profitable service and used car businesses.
 Age of the relationship was measured by a single item that
 assessed how long the dealer had carried the supplier's prod-
 uct line.
 Environmental uncertainty in the reseller's market area
 was measured by four items extracted from Heide and
 John's (1988) market environment scale. It assesses how
 volatile and unpredictable the reseller's territory is for the
 supplier's products.
 The summary statistics for the measures are reported in
 Table 1.
 RESULTS
 Our data analysis procedures combined an adaptation of
 Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) two-step approach with the
 process for analyzing data from multiple countries used by
 Durvasula and colleagues (1993). Before relations among
 constructs and mean differences can be examined in cross-
 cultural research, one must establish that the constructs and
 measures utilized are not culturally bound (Triandis 1982).
 First, we ascertained the metric equivalence (i.e., equiva-
 lence in factor structure and internal consistency) of our
 constructs across the two countries using confirmatory fac-
 tor analysis. Second, the hypotheses were tested using mul-
 tiple regression analysis. Finally, after establishing measure-
 ment equivalence and cross-national stability of structural
 relations among constructs, we compared construct means
 between the American and Dutch samples (cf. Durvasula et
 al. 1993; Hui and Triandis 1985).
 Measurement Analysis
 The six constructs in our study are relationship quality,
 distributive fairness, procedural fairness, outcomes given al-
 ternatives, age, and environmental uncertainty. We evaluat-
 ed the psychometric properties of all constructs (except the
 single-item measure of age) by conducting a series of con-
 firmatory factor analyses on the covariance matrices using
 LISREL 7. Consistent with our theoretical argument, the
 measurement model for the 25 relationship quality items
 was conceptualized as a second-order factor model. Each of
 the items loaded appropriately onto one of the seven first-
 order factors (affective conflict, manifest conflict, trust in
 supplier's honesty, trust in supplier's benevolence, affective
 commitment, expectation of continuity, willingness to in-
 vest), with the first-order factors originating from the sec-
 ond-order factor of relationship quality. The discriminant
 validity between the two fairness dimensions was stringent-
 ly evaluated by including all 11 distributive and procedural
 fairness items in a single two-factor model. Outcomes given
 alternatives (four items) and environmental uncertainty
 (four items) were conceptualized as single-factor models.4
 Metric equivalence of the measures was evaluated
 through a series of analyses at the national, multigroup, and
 pooled-data levels. This procedure constitutes a rigorous ex-
 amination of cross-national equivalence of the measures
 (Bond 1988; Durvasula et al. 1993; see also Bollen 1989).
 The national-level analysis examines whether the psycho-
 metric properties of the measures exhibit a similar pattern
 across the two countries, whereas the multigroup approach
 looks for the presence of an invariant pattern of parameter
 estimates across the countries.
 By examining the overall fit indices from sequential mod-
 els, one can evaluate whether imposing additional equality
 parameter constraints results in substantially inferior mod-
 els. Both our national-level and multigroup analyses indi-
 cated strong support for the cross-national equivalence of
 the scales; therefore, we could proceed with pooled data
 analysis.5
 The pooled analysis attempts to remove culturally id-
 iosyncratic patterns from the data by standardizing the re-
 sponses to each item separately in each country. This allows
 the data to become decultured; the true correlation between
 any two items is not affected by culture-specific factors, be-
 cause the average scores in each sample are now zero (Bond
 1988). The decultured data are then pooled across countries
 and analyzed in aggregate. The overall fit indices (chi-
 square, Comparative Fit Index, and Tucker-Lewis Index) for
 the measurement models from this pooled analysis were as
 follows:
 Measurement Model
 Relationship quality
 Distributive/procedural fairness
 Outcomes given alternatives
 Environmental uncertainty
 Chi-square
 (degrees of
 freedom)
 926.35 (268)
 322.60 (43)
 3.20 (1)
 10.51 (2)
 CFI
 .93
 .91
 1.00
 .98
 TU
 .92
 .89
 .99
 .94
 These measurement models are acceptable because the
 CFI/TLI indices are close to or greater than the .90 recom-
 mended level. All first-order and second-order (applicable in
 the case of relationship quality) factor loadings were signif-
 icant, demonstrating convergent validity.6 Discriminant va-
 lidity between procedural and distributive fairness is evi-
 denced by their intercorrelation of .499, which is signifi-
 4The model for outcomes given alternatives included a correlated error
 term between the items pertaining to sales and profits, because the initial
 LISREL results indicated that this term was necessary to achieve accept-
 able model fit A high level of shared specificity between these two items
 is not unexpected, given that dealer sales and profits from a particular line
 are usually highly intertwined.
 SA longer version of the paper, which reports the detailed results, is avail-
 able from the authors.
 6The minimum first-order t-value is 9.4; the minimum second-order t-
 value is 12.2.
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 Table 1
 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS
 Netherlands United States Correlation Matrix
 Variable Mean SD Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1.
 1. Relationship Quality 5.06 .93 5.00 1.03 1.00 .90 .82 .85 .65 .66 -.82 -.76 .72 .54 .53 -.04
 2. Trust: benevolence 4.74 1.20 4.34 1.41 .85 1.00 .72 .75 .52 .61 -.70 -.61 .71 .51 .47 -.08
 3. Trust: honesty 4.65 1.16 4.55 1.31 .76 .62 1.00 .66 .39 .43 -.67 -.55 .72 .46 .45 -.02
 4. Affective commitment 5.03 1.24 5.20 1.41 .78 .64 .55 1.00 .47 .55 -.64 -.57 .60 .47 .44 .02
 5. Expectation of continuity 5.48 1.19 5.81 1.08 .72 .59 .37 .50 1.00 .51 -.42 -.39 .36 .30 .35 -.06
 6. Willingness to invest 5.15 1.01 5.35 1.01 .64 .60 .33 .57 .45 1.00 -.37 -.34 .38 .35 .28 -.03
 7. Affective conflict 2.14 .95 2.36 1.03 -.78 -.59 -.60 -.48 -.47 -.29 1.00 .62 -.63 -.47 -.50 .04
 8. Manifest conflict 2.64 1.48 2.99 1.49 -.75 -.51 -.54 -.44 -.46 -.29 .61 1.00 -.51 -.39 -.38 .00
 9. Procedural fairness 4.34 1.06 4.01 1.13 .71 .69 .72 .54 .38 .37 -.60 -.46 1.00 .47 .46 -.06
 10. Distributive fairness 4.63 .95 4.84 1.17 .35 .34 .36 .29 .17 .28 -.26 -.19 .29 1.00 .35 -.01
 11. Outcomes given alternatives 4.09 .82 3.80 1.05 .46 .42 .40 .40 .23 .33 -.33 -.31 .49 .35 1.00 .02
 12. Relationship age 19.01 13.85 28.12 19.66 .04 .04 .02 .03 .05 -.01 -.06 -.00 .06 -.04 .06 1.00
 13. Environmental uncertainty 4.03 .92 4.15 .97 -.22 -.21 -.23 -.20 -.12 -.14 .20 .09 -.26 -.16 -.17 -.07 1
 Notes:
 Correlations above the diagonal are for the American sample; those below the diagonal are for the Dutch sample.
 All correlation coefficients > .19 in the Dutch sample and .16 in the American sample are significant atp < .001, whereas correlation coefficients > .12 in the Dutch sample and .10 in the American samp
 are significant at p < .05.
 0,
 0
 3
 .31
 .28
 .32
 .19 c-
 .23 0
 .19 C
 .25 m
 .24 z
 .28 r-
 .27 0
 .31 '1
 .08 5
 .00 >
 -IC
 G)
 m
 0:
 o
 Ca
 C,
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 17 Aug 2017 09:02:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Supplier Fairness
 candy below unity (p < .0001). The composite reliability
 was .88 for procedural fairness, .78 for distributive fairness,
 .68 for enviionmental uncertainty, .87 for outcomes given
 alternatives, and .94 for relationship quality.7 The reliability
 of the first-order factors of relationship quality ranged be-
 tween .67 and .90.
 The national-level, multigroup as well as the pooled anal-
 ysis indicate a high level of cross-national equivalence at the
 measurement level for the various constructs. Therefore, we
 can now test the hypotheses (Triandis 1982).
 Hypotheses Testing
 To test the hypotheses, the following regression equation
 was estimated for each country separately and for the two
 countries pooled:
 Y = pIXl + P2X2 + 33X3 + 34X4 + p5X5 + P6X1X3 + 17X2X3
 + 13X1X4 + 39X2X4 + 1310X1X5 + P11X2X5
 where Y denotes relationship quality, XI is procedural fair-
 ness, X2 is distributive fairness, X3 indicates outcomes
 given alternatives, X4 is age of relationship, X5 denotes en-
 vironmental uncertainty, XiXj denotes the interaction be-
 tween constructs Xi and Xj, and the P's indicate standard-
 ized regression coefficients.
 Following Lastovicka and Thamodaran (1991), factor
 scores, rather than an unweighted linear composite of the
 item scores, were used in the regression analysis. The factor
 score coefficients obtained in the pooled analysis were
 utilized.
 The Chow test revealed no statistical difference in the es-
 timated regression coefficients for the United States and
 Netherlands (F(12, 682) = 1.19, p > .10). This indicates
 cross-national stability of structural relations; therefore,
 pooling of the two samples is justified (Chow 1960).8 The
 results from the pooled regression are reported in Table 2.
 The R-square of .630 indicates a satisfactory level of ex-
 planation of the relationship quality construct by the con-
 structs included in our regression model. Both procedural ((3
 = .548, p < .001) and distributive fairness ([3 = .208, p <
 .001) have a positive impact on relationship quality, which
 supports Hla.9 In addition, procedural fairness has a signifi-
 cantly (p < .001) greater impact on relationship quality than
 distributive fairness, supporting Hlb.
 Consistent with H2a, outcomes given alternatives has a
 positive effect ([3 = .144, p < .001) on relationship quality.
 Examining the two interaction terms in Table 2 indicates
 that as the outcomes from this relationship (in relation to al-
 ternatives) increase, procedural fairness becomes less im-
 portant in determining relationship quality (3 = -.122, p <
 7Usually, the reliability of the second-order scores is not computed. We
 approximated the reliability of the relationship quality construct by adapt-
 ing a procedure used by Tanaka and Huba (1984). Approximate loadings of
 the items on the second-order factor were computed by multiplying the
 standardized first-order loadings with the standardized secondder load-
 ings. The approximate loadings for the 25 relationship quality items com-
 puted in this way were used to estimate the composite reliability.
 8The similarity in structural relations between the two countries lends ad-
 ditional support to the equivalence of the constructs across the two coun-
 tries (Hui and Triandis 1985).
 9Because we have directional hypotheses, all p values relating to the re-
 gression coefficients are for one-sided tests.
 Table 2
 EFFECTS ON RELATIONSHIP QUALITY
 Independent variable Beta
 Procedural fairness .548**
 Distributive fairness .208**
 Outcomes given alternatives .144**
 Age of the relationship -.012
 Environmental uncertainty -.041*
 Procedural fairness * Outcomes given alternatives -.122**
 )istributive fairness * Outcomes given alternatives .051*
 Procedural fairness * Age of the relationship -.029
 Distributive fairness * Age of the relationship .040
 Procedural fairness * Environmental uncertainty .051*
 Distributive fairness * Environmental uncertainty -.044
 Notes:
 **p < .001 (one-sided)
 *p < .05 (one-sided)
 R2 = .630 (p < .001)
 .001), whereas distributive fairness becomes more important
 ([3 = .051, p = .049). Thus, H2b is supported.
 Contrary to H3a, no main effects of age on relationship
 quality are observed (3 = -.012). H3b is also not supported,
 because neither the interaction of age with procedural fair-
 ness ([3 = -.029) nor with distributive fairness ([3 = .040) is
 significant. All hypotheses related to age therefore were re-
 jected. This suggests that relationships of any age can attain
 high levels of relationship quality. Alternatively, because our
 sample represented mostly mature, developed relationships
 with few newly formed or young alliances, perhaps there
 was insufficient variation.
 Finally, H4a is supported, because environmental uncer-
 tainty has a negative effect (3 = -.041, p = .046) on rela-
 tionship quality. Consistent with H4b, as environmental un-
 certainty increases, procedural fairness becomes more im-
 portant ([ = .05 1, p = .046). However, although there is a
 tendency for distributive fairness to become less impo-lant
 in determining relationship quality as environmental uncer-
 tainty increases, it is not significant (3 = -.044, p = .074).
 Differences in Means Between the United States and
 the Netherlands
 Given the metric equivalence of the constructs and the
 stability of the structural relationship between the two sam-
 ples, it is appropriate to investigate differences in the mean
 ratings on the constructs across the American and Dutch
 samples (Hui and Triandis 1985; Durvasula et al. 1993). The
 mean ratings were as follows:10
 Construct
 Relationship quality
 Procedural fairness
 Distributive fairness
 Outcomes given alternatives
 Age of relationship
 Enviro,,niental uncertainty
 United
 States Netherlands Difference
 4.77 4.93 n.s.
 4.05 4.42 p < .001
 4.72 4.62 n.s.
 3.79 4.06 p < .001
 28.12 19.01 p < .001
 4.22 4.19 n.s.
 IOMean ratings on the constructs were computed by averaging subjects'
 weighted linear composite of the item scores, using the factor score regres-
 sion coefficients obtained in the pooled analysis as weights (Alwin and
 Jackson 1979). Thus, mean ratings differ slightly from the unweighted
 means reported in Table 2.
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 The mean rating on procedural fairness is significantly
 higher in the Netherlands than in the United States, whereas
 there is a tendency, although not significant, for higher dis-
 tributive fairness in the United States (p = .186).
 These findings are consistent with Hofstede's (1993) find-
 ing that the United States is a more masculine culture than
 the Netherlands. More feminine cultures place less empha-
 sis on ego-based, individual achievement and more on inter-
 personal, socially-oriented goals, a situation that is con-
 ducive to higher levels of procedural fairness. Apparently,
 procedural fairness is more consistent with femininity and
 distributive fairness is more consistent with masculinity (cf.
 Hirschman 1993). Given these findings, it is not surprising
 that the mean rating on relationship quality also shows a ten-
 dency to be higher in the Netherlands than in the United
 States (p = .053), because it was found to be influenced
 more by procedural than distributive fairness.
 On average, the Dutch rate higher on outcomes given al-
 ternatives, indicating that Dutch dealers view their major
 supplier as more attractive in relation to other automobile
 suppliers than American dealers. Perhaps American dealers
 have a greater number of relatively attractive alternatives
 compared to their Dutch counterparts, possibly due to the
 relatively large Japanese presence in the U.S. market. Final-
 ly, because the U.S. automobile market is older and more
 mature, the average age of the relationship is shorter in the
 Netherlands. No significant differences were observed on
 environmental uncertainty.
 DISCUSSION
 Limitations
 Before developing the implications of our results, several
 limitations of our study should be noted. First, we examine
 what is an asymmetrical channel structure. An important
 question left unanswered is whether fairness is as important
 in balanced power structures and to the more powerful part-
 ner in unbalanced relationships. Anderson and Weitz (1992)
 found fairness to have a significant effect on commitment
 only for distributors not manufacturers. Given that relative-
 ly powerful partners can fight for their rights and set up de-
 sired procedures for the relationship, we speculate that pro-
 cedural justice may be relatively unimportant to them.
 Second, we did not examine the principles implicitly used
 by the dealers in their assessment of distributive fairness.
 Now that this study has established that distributive fairness
 has an impact on channel relationships, further research is
 needed to explore whether channel partners base distributive
 fairness evaluations on equity, equality, or some other
 norm(s).
 Third, our finding that procedural fairness is more impor-
 tant than distributive fairness may have been enhanced by
 the shared method variance between procedural justice and
 the various dependent variables.11 However, it must be
 noted that several studies that reported experimental results
 from social psychology also support our finding that proce-
 dural justice has a stronger impact than distributive justice
 (Tyler and Lind 1992).
 Finally, we examined fairness from the reseller's perspec-
 tive. The supplier will also have opinions regarding how
 fairly it is treating its resellers and the fairness of a reseller's
 outcomes. Further research is needed to examine when
 channel partners' fairness perceptions differ, under what cir-
 cumstances criteria for the assessment of procedural and
 distributive fairness are shared by the channel partners, and
 whether such unanimity of perspectives is possible or
 important.
 Theoretical Implications
 Day, Weitz, and Wensley (1990, p. 91) note that "research
 needs to be directed toward improving our understanding of
 how long-term relationships in channels develop." Re-
 searchers have argued that channel relationships that are im-
 balanced in terms of power tend to demonstrate a high level
 of conflict and low levels of cooperation, communication,
 trust, and stability (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1989; Dwyer,
 Schurr, and Oh 1987; Stern and Reve 1980). Although this
 may be true in general, our results demonstrate that trust and
 commitment can be developed, even in highly asymmetrical
 relationships if the vulnerable party is treated fairly by its
 more powerful partner.
 Fairness previously has been conceptualized as a unitary
 concept in channels research (Anderson and Weitz 1989,
 1992). We introduce to the marketing channels literature two
 components of fairness-distributive fairness and procedu-
 ral fairness. Methodologically, we find discriminant validity
 between the two constructs; resellers do not always perceive
 fair outcomes as resulting from fair supplier procedures and
 vice versa.
 Theoretically, Lind and Tyler (1988, p. 1) note that in be-
 havioral and social sciences (especially economics) "people
 have often been viewed as evaluating social experiences, re-
 lationships, and institutions on the basis of the outcomes that
 they receive...and [this] conforms to widely held lay views
 of 'human nature.'"' Our results demonstrate that whereas
 both procedural and distributive justice have positive im-
 pacts on relationship quality, procedural justice has the
 stronger affect. This result persists even after controlling for
 the effects of outcomes. Unlike previous studies on justice,
 which were conducted at the individual level, our results
 demonstrate that even supposedly profit-maximizing re-
 sellers are more interested in process than outcomes and that
 their evaluation of the supplier is driven by the form of so-
 cial interaction.
 Measurement Implications
 Gundlach and Murphy (1993) recently asserted that four
 dimensions are crucial to ethical exchanges: trust, equity, re-
 sponsibility, and commitment. If one accepts procedural jus-
 tice as roughly corresponding to what they consider respon-
 sibility, our research offers scales that measure each of these
 concepts. Our procedural fairness scale incorporates six
 principles of justice. The correlation between this scale and
 our global measure of procedural fairness is very high, sug-
 gesting adequate content validity and sampling of the do-
 main of the construct. Nonetheless, researchers may wish to
 I ln addition, one reviewer argued that it is impossible to examine the
 relative impact of independent variables using regression coefficients.
 62
 examine in other contexts to see whether all six principles
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 17 Aug 2017 09:02:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Supplier Fairness
 are necessary, whether they are compensatory, and whether
 other important procedural justice principles exist.
 Trust, it appears, is one of those concepts that is recog-
 nizable in practice but rather difficult to define conceptual-
 ly. We find discriminant validity between two related as-
 pects-trust in the partner's honesty and trust in the part-
 ner's benevolence-that encompass previous definitions of
 trust in the channels literature. This is significant given
 Larzelere and Huston's (1980, p. 596) fear that "while
 benevolence and honesty are conceptually distinct, they may
 turn out to be so intertwined...that they are operationally in-
 separable."
 Organizational research operationalizes commitment in
 two major ways. Some researchers focus on affective com-
 mitment, that is, the desire to stay in the relationship be-
 cause of the positive affect toward the other party (Meyer,
 Allen, and Smith 1991). Others adopt a broader view of
 commitment, incorporating continuity expectations and
 willingness to invest (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992). Our
 approach integrates both approaches by specifying affective
 commitment, continuity expectations, and willingness to in-
 vest as separate facets. Depending upon their objectives, re-
 searchers may examine one or all of these concepts.
 Finally, the effects of procedural and distributive fairness
 on the individual first-order factors of relationship quality
 were consistent with the reported effects on the second-
 order relationship quality construct. However, when causal
 variables are hypothesized to have differential effects on
 trust, affective commitment, continuity, willingness to in-
 vest, and/or conflict, researchers should explore these fac-
 tors as separate constructs.
 Cross-National Implications
 A recent review of international marketing research con-
 cluded that the "management of distribution practices...ap-
 pears to be sadly neglected" (Douglas and Craig 1992, p.
 307). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in
 marketing channels that compares survey data from two
 countries. Despite the cultural differences and variations in
 sample composition, competitive conditions, and legal envi-
 ronment between the two countries, both the scales and the
 theory demonstrate high levels of cross-national consisten-
 cy. There are, however, some differences in means across the
 two countries that are consistent with both the pattern of re-
 gression results and Hofstede's research.
 There is considerable debate over standardized versus
 adaptive global marketing strategies. The remarkable stabil-
 ity of regression coefficients suggests that resellers in both
 countries are motivated by similar concerns. Although we
 obviously cannot generalize from this study to other coun-
 tries or other substantive marketing issues, we may some-
 times be overlooking many important areas of correspon-
 dence in our search for cross-national differences. Demon-
 strating areas of similarities between cultures is just as use-
 ful as identifying areas of uniqueness. The procedures ap-
 plied in this paper may prove useful for testing cross-cultur-
 al equivalence while exploring the differences between
 countries.
 Managerial Implications
 Although powerful manufacturers may have the ability to
 take advantage of vulnerable resellers by dictating dealer
 margins as well as instituting procedures that favor them-
 s.elves, this may not be the wisest course. The impact of fair-
 ness on dealer perceptions must be considered if developing
 stable, effective channel partnerships is a goal.
 Our study demonstrates that vulnerable resellers are sen-
 sitive to violations of fairness by their more powerful part-
 ners. It also indicates that resellers become more sensitive to
 procedural fairness in the face of environmental uncertainty
 or when outcomes received from carrying the supplier's line
 are less attractive than what the reseller can obtain from
 stocking competing product lines.
 Perhaps our most managerially significant and apparently
 counterintuitive finding is that procedural fairness is rela-
 tively more important than distributive fairness in develop-
 ing effective long-term relationships. Discussions with a
 number of managers representing manufacturers both with-
 in and outside the automobile industry indicate that they be-
 lieve dealers are primarily concerned with margins or dis-
 tributive fairness. Yet, interviews with dealers indicate
 greater distress over procedural fairness.
 It appears managers in general may place too great an im-
 portance on margins and outcomes as a means to develop ef-
 fective channel relationships, while they neglect procedural
 factors. Higher margins to dealers can almost always be
 matched by one's competitors and, all else being equal, in-
 creased margins to dealers are likely to result in reduced
 margins for the manufacturer and/or less value for the
 customer.
 Developing procedurally fair channel management sys-
 tems requires greater effort, energy, investment, patience,
 and perhaps even an alteration in organizational culture. For
 precisely these reasons, enhancements in procedural fair-
 ness are more likely to constitute the basis for a sustainable
 competitive advantage. Such channel partnerships, in con-
 cert with other long-term relationships with customers, em-
 ployees, and suppliers, constitute a firm's unique, nonrepli-
 cable, architecture and therefore are the ultimate source of
 corporate success (Economist 1993).
 Measurement Appendix1
 Distributive Fairness
 How fair are your firm's outcomes and earnings compared to:2
 1. the effort and investment that we have made to support the supplier's
 line.
 2. the roles and responsibilities the supplier assigns to our organization.
 3. what other dealers in our industry earn.
 4. what the supplier earns from sales through our dealership.
 5. the contributions we make to this supplier's marketing effort.
 Procedural Fairness
 In relationships with their dealers, the supplier and their personnel
 1. Bilateral communication
 a. promote bilateral communication with the dealers.
 b. a high level of two-way communication exists.
 2. Impartiality
 a. do not discriminate but rather treat all dealers similarly.
 b. apply consistent policies and decision making procedures across
 all dealers.
 3. Refutability
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 a. sometimes alter their policies in response to dealer objections.
 b. seriously consider a dealer's objections to the supplier's policies
 and programs.
 4. Explanation
 a. seldom explain their decisions to dealers. (R)
 b. provide valid reasons for any changes in policies affecting the
 dealers.
 5. Knowledgeability
 a. are knowledgeable about the local situations faced by the dealers.
 b. take pains to learn the local conditions under which the dealers
 operate.
 6. Courteous behavior
 a. treat the dealers with respect.
 b. are polite and well-mannered.
 Relationship Quality
 1. Affective conflict
 When your firm reflects on the relationship with the supplier, does
 your firm feel3
 a. anger
 b. frustration
 c. resentment
 d. hostility
 2. Manifest conflict
 a. A high degree of conflict exists between the supplier and our firm.
 b. The supplier and our firm have major disagreements on certain key
 issues.
 3. Trust in partner's honesty
 a. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we
 are confident that they are telling the truth.
 b. The supplier has often provided us information which has later
 proven to be inaccurate. (R)
 c. The supplier usually keeps the promises they make to our firm.
 d. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business operations,
 we know they are sharing their best judgment.
 e. Our organi7ation can count on the supplier to be sincere.
 4. Trust in partner's benevolence
 a. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be
 ready and willing to offer us assistance and support
 b. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about
 our welfare.
 c. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that they
 will respond with understanding.
 d. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider how its de-
 cisions and actions will affect us.
 e. When it comes to things which are important to us, we can depend
 on the supplier's support
 5. Commitment
 a. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we like
 being associated with them.
 b. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network, because
 we genuinely enjoy our relationship with them.
 c. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason we
 continue working with them.
 6. Expectation of continuity
 a. We expect our relationship with the supplier to continue for a long
 time.
 b. Renewal of relationship with supplier is virtually automatic.
 c. It is unlikely that our firm will still be doing business with this sup-
 plier in 2 years. (R)
 7. Willingness to invest
 a. If the supplier requested it, we would be willing to make further in-
 vestment in supporting the supplier's line.
 b. We are willing to put more effort and investment in building our
 business in the supplier's product.
 c. In the future we will work to link our firm with the supplier's in the
 customer's mind.
 Outcomes Given Alternatives
 How attractive is your current supplier compared to the next best alter-
 native supplier in terms of4
 1. Generating sales?
 2. Generating profits?
 3. Providing support and selling services?
 4. Generating customer traffic?
 Age of the Relationship
 How many years has your firm carried the supplier's products?
 Environmental Uncertainty
 How would you describe the market environment in your sales area for
 the supplier's products?5
 1. easy to monitor trends - difficult to monitor trends
 2. stable industry volume e volatile industry volume
 3. sales forecasts are quite accurate e- sales forecasts are quite
 inaccurate
 4. predictable *- unpredictable
 Notes:
 IAll are seven-point scales with strongly disagree and strongly agree as
 the anchors unless noted otherwise.
 2Seven-point scales with unfair and fair as the anchors.
 3Five-point scales with strongly feels this way and does not feel this
 way as the anchors.
 4Seven-point scales with current supplier is much less attractive and
 current supplier is much more attractive as the anchors.
 5Seven-point scales with these anchors.
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